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Abstract
This paper deals with the externalities associated with the individual developing country’s cost 
of credit and borrowing level. As long as the supply curve of credit is positively sloped, the 
interest rate charged on credit extended to a particular developing country is affected by the 
aggregate borrowing level of the rest of the countries. Moreover, the relatively high level of 
indebtedness of big developing countries and their problems to service their external debts, 
might adversely affect the reputation of the developing countries as a whole and reduce their 
financial credibility. The estimation of the interest rate equations confirms the significant role of 
these externalities in explaining the cost of credit to individual countries in the three distinct 
developing regions of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, 
since the individual country's information about the borrowing of the other debtor countries is 
not perfect, this country perceives the interest rate on loans taken as a random variable, and 
hence might suffer from substantial costs of risk bearing. The implications of this type of 
externality on the borrowing behaviour of developing countries are analyzed within the context 
of a stochastic framework in which countries borrowing large amount of money behave like 
Stackelberg leaders. The estimation of the derived borrowing equations are found to be 
statistically significant in the cases of Latin America and Asia-Pacific.
*The author is a member of the Department of Economics at Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel, 
and the Department of Economics at The University of Wollongong, Wollongong, New South Wales 2500, 
Australia. The author is grateful to Mark Freeman for a meticulous research assistantship in data collection and 
statistical analysis.
1. INTRODUCTION
While capital accumulation, per-capita income, and income inequality were the 
predominant issues of development economics in the post-world war II era, it is the 
external debts of the less developed countries that have captured the attention of 
development economists as well as the attention of main stream economists in the last 
decade. During the 1970's and the 1980's the aggregate indebtedness of developing 
countries grew very rapidly leading to a heightened concern about their ability to repay 
their debts. The growing debts also led to an increase in income inequality and poverty 
levels caused by the cuts in subsidies and wages prescribed by debt-relief programmes. 
According to Berg and Sachs' (1988) estimation results, this increase in the income 
inequality and poverty levels might raise the probability of insolvency and the need for 
debt rescheduling and discount; and hence intensifies the already mounting tension 
between the developing countries and the industrialized countries even further.
Furthermore, the large external debts accumulated by the LDCs tended further to 
adversely affect their growth prospects. Thus, Krugman (1989) and Sachs (1988, 1989) 
argue that high governmental debt-service payments require high tax rates that discourage 
capital formation and repatriation of flight capital. Similarly, Dornbusch (1988) argues 
that the fact that the government is the the main maker of debt-service payments in most 
of the heavily indebted countries moderates the improving effect of devaluation on the 
trade balance. The underlying reason is that a devaluation raises the domestic-currency 
costs of servicing the foreign-currency debt. Thus in turn, increases the budget deficit, 
raises the inflation rate, and reduces the competitiveness of the country's export. As a 
result, most of the LDCs have seen their growth rates slow, and many have seen living 
standards that were often already pitifully low fall even further.
The major sources of continuous and rapid accumulation of external debts by the 
LDCs are: (1) inefficient allocation of resources stemming from inward- looking trade 
policy supported by tariffs and licences; (2) domestic instability and inflation; (3) the 
dramatic increase of oil prices in the 1970s followed by the rapid decline of these prices in 
the 1980s; and (4) the rise of the inflation rate in the U.S. and Western Europe in the
early 1980s, that led to a hike of the interest rate. The present paper is concerned with the 
externalities affecting the later factor.
In addition to the inflation in the creditors’ countires, the interest rate charged on 
the individual developing country's liabilities might also reflect this country's financial 
position in the credit market. However, there might be other factors, that are external to 
the individual developing country, affecting the cost of credit and providing further 
explanation of the rapid growth of the country's level of indebtedness. As long as the 
supply curve of credit is positively sloped, the interest rate charged on credit extended to a 
particular country should be affected by the aggregate borrowing level of the rest of the 
countries. Moreover, the relatively high level of indebtedness of large developing 
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico in Latin America and Nigeria and Zaire in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, and their problems to service their external debts, might adversely affect 
the reputation of the developing countries as a whole and reduce their financial credibility.
The purpose of this paper is to explore, test, and quantify the effects of the 
aforementioned external factors on the cost of credit for the individual developing country 
and its level of borrowing. The assessment of the role of these external factors is carried 
out in the following sections. Section 2 presents a statistical summary of the external 
debt, external debt burden, and interest rate for three developing regions —  Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific— in the period 1975-1986. Section 2 also 
compares the time trajectories of the interest rate and tests whether the differences in 
interest rates charged on credit extended to these regions are statistically significant. 
Confirmation of this hypothesis might indicate the existence of fundamental differences 
among the three developing regions with regard to access to credit suppliers and level of 
indebtedness and hence support the classification of the developing countries by regional 
affiliation. Section 3 takes into account credit-supply's considerations, and estimates the 
external effects of the regions' level of indebtedness and borrowing on the interest rate 
charged on credit extended to each individual country.
Furthermore, since the individual country does not have full information about the 
borrowing of its counterpart debtors, it perceives the interest rate on loans taken as a 
random variable, and hence might suffer from substantial costs of risk bearing. Section 4
analyzes the implications of this type of externality, as well as the implications of the 
aforementioned externalities associated with the cost of credit, on the borrowing 
behaviour of developing countries within the context of a stochastic framework, in which 
countries borrowing large amounts of money behave like Stackelberg leaders — 
maximizes expected utility from consumption subject to their resource constraint while 
taking into account the reaction of the following smaller borrowing countries. The 
parameters of the resultant Stackleberg equilibrium borrowing equations for leading and 
following developing countries are estimated for each region, and the existence of 
external effects on their borrowing behaviours is tested in Section 5.
Finally, a conceptual analysis of a jointly co-ordinated credit system, which takes 
into account global welfare considerations as well as the individual country's welfare, and 
which is capable of moderating the potential adverse effects of the aforementioned 
externalities, is briefly described in Section 6.
2 . TH E BURDEN OF TH E EXTERNAL DEBT AND IN TEREST
RA TES
Developing countries are often affiliated to regional reference groups such as Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific. The underlying rationale is that greater 
geographical affinity facilitates transfer of both positive and negative externalities between 
countries. It is therefore possible that the well-being of an individual country is affected 
by the overall performances of its reference group.
A statistical summary of the aggregate level of indebtedness of the aforementioned 
regional groups and the interest rates paid on their external liabilities is given in Table 1 
below for the priod 1975-1986 that encompases the aftermath of the first oil shock, the 
second oil shock, the oil glut and the fall of the oil prices, and the rise of the interest rates. 
This table presents the evolution of the absolute external debt level (in billions of 1985 
U.S. Dollars) of each regional group as a whole (ZD), as well as the proportions of these 
levels of external debts of the regional groups' aggregate output (d) which can be viewed 
as indicators of the regional groups' average abilities to service their debts. The average 
annual real interest rates (r) are proxied by the ratios of interest payments (public plus
private) made by the regional groups during each year to the aggregate external debt levels 
at the beginning of the year. It is important to note that in many incidences the actual 
interest payments were smaller than the due ones. In these incidences, the ratio of interest 
payments to external debt level understates the interest rates agreed upon. It is assumed 
that such downward biased effective interest rates were a-priori expected by the creditors 
and were incorporated into their decisions about the supply of credit to various countries.
Table 1. The total external debt (in Billions of U.S. 1985 dollars), a v e ra g e  
debt burden, and average real interest rates for Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific*
Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa As ia-P ac if ic
Year I D d r I D d r I D d r
1975 93.691 0.1497 0.0618 25.203 0.2698 0.0299 57.567 0.1587 0.0242
1976 111.664 0.1531 0.0658 28.052 0.3065 0.0266 62.436 0.1732 0.0276
1977 129.187 0.1537 0.0569 31.309 0.3193 0.0281 67.597 0.1741 0.0298
1978 155.800 0.2080 0.0657 37.161 0.2674 0.0278 71.193 0.1746 0.0316
1979 168.957 0.2062 0.0821 41.259 0.3084 0.0328 68.568 0.1668 0.0404
1980 171.044 0.1888 0.1027 43.930 0.3011 0.0445 72.835 0.1623 0.0398
1981 182.673 0.1892 0.1039 45.930 0.3429 0.0371 74.053 0.1643 0.0404
1982 194.586 0.2451 0.1079 47.970 0.3843 0.0364 83.130 0.1858 0.0407
1983 240.062 0.3486 0.0899 52.006 0.4456 0.0356 91.839 0.2128 0.0410
1984 259.680 0.4045 0.0819 50.152 0.5539 0.0413 95.168 0.2285 0.0434
1985 270.968 0.4252 0.0865 55.294 0.6157 0.0390 109.004 0.2598 0.0404
1986 288.880 0.0745 67.539 0.0201 99.513 0.0415
Average r 0.0816 0.0333 0.0367
Stand. Dev. r 0.0165 0.0067 0.0062
*The three reference groups include the following countries: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad, Uruguay, and Venezuela in Latin 
America; Burundi, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leona, Somalia, Sudan,Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zaire in Sub-Saharan Africa; and Burma,Fiji, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua-New Gineau, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand in Asia-Pacific. 
The computations o f ZD, d, and r are based on these countries’ external debts, GNP, and interest 
payments published in the World Debt Tables. External Debts of Developing Countries, volumes I, II and 
III, The World Bank, Washington D.C., USA.
Table 1 reveals that the external debts and debt burden of the three regional groups 
increased substantially during the inspected period. On the average the Latin American 
countries had larger external debts than the Asia-Pacificn and African countries. The Latin 
American and African groups’ debt-burden indices rose dramatically during the 1980s 
due to the increase in the absolute level of indebtedness as well as to the decline in the 
aggregate product. In contrast, the Asia-Pacific’s debt burden rose very moderately due 
to a lower rate of increase in the absolute level of indebtedness and a lower rate of decline 
in the aggregate product. While the interest rate on credit extended 
to the Latin American countries rose substantially and steadily to a peak of 10.79 percent 
in 1982, it varied very moderately for the Sub-Saharan African and Asia-Pacificn 
countries. Furthermore, the average annual real interest rate for the Latin American group 
was substantially higher than that of the other reference groups. During the inspected 
period, the average annual real interest rate differentials between the Latin American 
group and the Sub-Saharan African and Asia-Pacificn groups were 4.83 percent and 4.49 
percent, respectively. These differentials are statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
of confidence. The statistical test reveals further that the interest rate differential between 
the Asia-Pacificn group and the Sub-Saharan African group is insignificant. These 
interest rate differentials suggest that there are fundamental differences among the three 
developing regions with regard to access to credit suppliers and level of indebtedness, 
and hence support the classification of the developing countries by regional affiliation.
3 .  EXTERNALITIES, CREDIT SUPPLY'S CONSIDERATIONS, AND 
THE ESTIMATION OF THE INTEREST RATE EQUATION
Under the assumption that a greater geographical affinity tends to facilitate the 
transfer of both positive and negative externalities between countries, it seems reasonable 
to hypothesize that the cost of credit for any country might be directly related to the 
current borrowing and initial levels of indebtedness of the group of countries with which 
it is associated, as well as to its own current borrowing and initial level of indebtedness. 
There are two ways by which developing countries belonging to a common regional 
group inflict such external effects on one another:
1. Given that the credit supply curve is positively sloped, the greater the group's 
aggregate borrowing, the higher the cost of credit to the individual country.
2. The greater the indebtedness level of the rest of the countries, the greater their 
incentive to repudiate and hence the lower the expected debt repayment. The 
decrease in the group's overall credibility leads creditors to charge higher interest 
rates on new loans extended to the country in order to accommodate the excessive 
risk.
In view of the aforementioned externalities and credit supply's considerations, it 
is suggested that the average interest rate (r) charged on the i-th country's borrowing at 
period t can be expressed in mathematical notations by the following ad-hock equation:
j N N
ri = r L Di t .j + r2 X D jj.j + r3 Bit + r4 X Bjt (1)
j* i j*i J
where, j= l,...,N  denotes the countries belonging to the regional group which the i-th 
country is affiliated to; and Djt.j are the i-th and the j-th countries' external debts at 
the end of the previous period, respectively; Bit is the i-th country's borrowing at period 
t; Bjt is the j-th country's borrowing at period t; and r 1,r2,r3, and r4 are parameters 
representing the effects of these factors, respectively, on the i-th country's assessment of 
the average cost of its new borrowing.
The purpose of this section is to estimate the unknown parameters of equation 1 in 
order to provide a preliminary assessment of the external effect of the regional reference 
group's aggregate level of indebtedness and borrowing on the cost of credit for the 
individual country member. The estimation of the interest rate equation is carried out with 
annual observations on countries listed in Table 1 and classified to the aforementioned 
regional groups for the period 1975 - 1986. All of the explanatory variables are 
expressed in millions of 1985 U.S. dollars. The estimation results are summarized in 
Table 2. An alternative specification of the interest-rate equation, in which the debt-
product ratios of the regional group and the individual country replace the respective 
absolute levels of debts, leads to significantly less satisfactory estimation results.
Table 2. The estimated interest rate equation; coeffic ien ts  for Latin  
America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific*
Estimated parameters for three reference groups
E x p la n a to ry






























R2 0.250 0.017 0.022
F-test 293.201 138.354 121.854
d.f. 260 314 122
*The t-ratios are indicated in the parentheses.
As indicated by the F-test values, the estimation results of the interest rate 
equation's parameters as a whole are statistically significant for the three regional groups 
of developing countries. Most particularly, the t-ratios show that for all of the three 
regional groups the initial level of indebtedness of a country as well as the initial level of 
indebtedness of the regional group to which the country is affiliated have, as expected, 
significant positive effects on the interest rate on that country's current borrowing. Only 
in the case of Asia-Pacific this effect of the individual country's level of indebtedness is 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, in the case of Asia-Pacific, the effect of an 
infinitesimal increase in the affiliation group's level of indebtedness on the interest rate on
the individual country's liabilities exceeds the effect of an infinitesimal increase in that 
country's own liabilities. If the likelihood of repudiation increases with the level of 
indebtedness, these findings imply that an increase in the level of indebtedness of a 
country and/or an increase in the level of indebtedness of the rest of the 
countries affiliated to the same regional group reduce that country's reputation in the 
credit market and hence raise the cost of its current borrowing.
A further indication of negative external effects among countries belonging to a 
regional group is that in the case of Latin America the aggregate current borrowing level 
of the rest of the countries significantly increases the cost of credit for the individual 
country member. The existence of this source of external effect was not confirmed for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific. A possible explanation to this variation in the 
estimation results is that, due to their low levels of per-capita income, a major part of the 
African and Asia-Pacificn countries' credit is provided by non-profit international funds, 
whereas the medium-income countries of Latin America rely more heavily on credit 
supplied by commercial banks. This distinction may also explain the significantly 
negative effect of the country's current borrowing on the interest rate for sub-Saharan 
African countries. The existence of structural differences in the credit supply across the 
three regional groups is indicated further by Chow tests.
4. UNCERTAINTY, RISK AVERSIO N, AND THE BORROW ING
BEHAVIOUR OF LDCs IN A STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
While the previous section's empirical ad-hock analysis of the supply of credit 
lends support to the hypothesis that the greater the reference group's aggregate borrowing 
and level of indebtedness, the higher the cost credit to the individual country; this section 
considers the implications of these external factors with a broader and more elaborate 
framework that also takes into account credit-demand's considerations. In this 
framework, each individual country maximizes expected utility from consumption and 
investment and takes into account the external effect inflicted by the rest of the countries' 
financial position and borrowing behaviour on its consumption possibilities. Moreover, it 
is assumed that the individual country does not have full information about the borrowing
of its counterpart debtor countries. Instead, it perceives the interest rate on loans taken 
during the present period as a random variable, and thus might suffer from substantial 
costs of risk bearing.
The following analysis is based on the assumption that the i-th country forms its 
expectations about the interest rate (n te) rationally by incorporating the credit-supply's 
considerations according to equation 1 and its assessment of the borrowing level of the 
rest of the countries. It is postulated that the i-th country's borrowing at t is chosen to 
maximize the country's (or the representative agent’s) expected utility from private 
consumption and investment and government spendings (C) subject to its perceived 
resource constraint:
Cjt = a i Bityit + NIMit - RPMjt - IPLjt - rjte Bjr (2)
In this formulation y; denotes the average productivity of a borrowed dollar 
directed to a production activity, and a,j is the proportion of the borrowing abroad serves 
to finance domestic production activities. The rest, (1 - otj)Bit, helps to finance the net 
import of consumption and investment goods (NIM), repayments of principal that 
matured (RPM), interest payments on liabilities accumulated previously (IPL) and on 
current borrowing.
The model refers to two Sub-groups of countries in a given reference group 
distinguished by the scale of their borrowing abroad —  the big borrowers vis-a-vis the 
smaller borrowers. In which case it seems reasonable to say that the Sub-group of the big 
borrowers is behaving as a leader (L) in a Stackelberg setting and the Sub-group of the 
smaller borrowers is behaving as a follower (F). The Stackelberg equilibrium is found by 
computing the follower's reaction to a given borrowing level of the leader. This reaction 
is incorporated, in turn, into the leader's decision about the optimal borrowing level.
The computation of the follower's reaction function assumes that the follower 
does not have full information about the leader's borrowing level, but that the follower's 
expectations about the leader's borrowing level are unbiased and normally distributed 
with finite variances <J2Lt:
BLte ~  N(BLt, o2Lt). (3)
This assumption and equations 1 and 2 imply that the follower's private and public 
consumption and investment (CFt) is normally distributed with mean and variance equal
E(Cpt) = 0Cp Bpt yFt + NIMpt - RPMFt - IPLpt
- [ r lD p t - l  +  r2 D Lt-l +  r3 B Ft +  r4 BLt]BFt (4)
VAR(Cpt) = /  G 2 B 2 . (5)
r i  4 Lt Ft
Assuming for tractability that the follower's preferences over CFt can be 
represented by a negative exponential utility function reflecting constant absolute risk 
aversion, the follower's current borrowing is found by maximizing the difference 
between the mean of CFt and the costs of risk-bearing that are equal to half the product of 
the variance of CFt and the follower's degree of absolute risk aversion (RF):
max [E(CFt) - 0.5RF VAR (CFt)] (6)
Bpt
(See Freund, 1956, for a rigourous development of the mean-variance expected utility 
function, and Hammond, 1974, and Meyer, 1987, for a discussion of the generality of 
this framework.)
The first-order condition for maximum implies that the expected increase in the 
Follower's private and public consumption and investment from an additional dollar 
borrowed abroad (i.e., the marginal product of credit minus the marginal interest payment 
on credit) is offset by the increase in its costs of risk bearing stemming from the 
uncertainty about the leader's borrowing level:
a F yFt " [r l D Ft-l +  r2D Lt-l +  2r3 B Ft +  r4 B l J  “  R Fr4 °L t B F f
The second-order condition for maximum
-2r3 - Rpr^ (JLt < 0 (8)
is satisfied as long as the marginal costs of credit for the follower are increasing.
The necessary condition for maximum implies that the reaction of the follower's 
borrowing to the leader's borrowing is given by:
BFt = P (aFyF - r iD F t- l' r2D Lt-l ‘ r4B Lt) (9)
where
(3 = l/(2r3 + RFr42o 2t) (10)
is by the second-order condition for maximum a positive term. Equations 9 and 10 imply 
that for any given leader's borrowing level, the follower's demand for credit is equal to 
the difference between the marginal product of a dollar borrowed abroad and the marginal 
cost stemming from the follwer's and leader's initial levels of indebtedness and the 
leader's current borrowing, divided by twice the marginal cost stemming from the 
follower's own borrowing and risk bearing.
The computation of the leader's borrowing level assumes that the leader 
maximizes utility from private and public consumption and investment subject to the 
follower's reaction function specified above. Given that the parameters of the follower's 
reaction function and the follower's initial level of indebtedness are known to the leader, 
the leader's costs of risk bearing are nil. This implies in turn that, in view of the mean- 
variance expected utility specification and equations 1, 2 and 9, the leader's decision 
problem can be rendered as:
max {aL BLt yLt + MINLt - RPMLt - IPLU 
Bli
'  tr l D L t - l + r2 D F t- l + r3 B Lt + r4 P (a F  >"Ft '  r l D F t- l ‘  r2D L t- l " r4B L t^ B Lt^' ^  ^
The resultant necessary condition for maximum implies that the leader's borrowing in a 
Stackelberg equilibrium (BLt*) is given by:
BLt* = 7t(a L yLt - r4 Pa F yFt) - (r l '  r2 r4p) D Lt-l '  (r2 '  r l r4p) ° F t- lJ  ( 12)
where
y = l/(2r3 - 2r42P). (13)
Correspondingly, the follower's borrowing level in a Stackelberg equilibrium (Bpt*) is 
found by substituting equation 12 for BLt in equation 9:
BFt* = PO - r42PY)«FyFt - H PyaLyLt - Pt(ri - r2 r4 y +  ri r42 Py)]Dfm
- p [( r2 -r ir4 Y + r2 r4 2 pY)]DLt-i (14)
Equations 12 and 14 implies the following propositions about the leading and 
following Sub-groups' borrowing behaviour in a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (the effect of Du-1 on Bn*):
dBu* > n 
dD u-i < U
ri < r4 as — = -------------—
r2 > 2r3 + Rp r42 aLt2
Proposition 1 implies that the likelihood that the leader's initial debt level deters its
borrowing at present:
a. rises with the follower's costs of risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty 
about the leader's borrowing at present (Rf  o n 2),
b. rises with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged on 
its own borrowing at present (ri),
c. declines with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate 
charged on the leader's borrowing at present (r2) through a decline in the 
credibility of the reference group to which the leader and the follower are 
affiliated.
Proposition 2 (the effect of Dpt-i on BLt*):
dSLt* > a 
dDpt-i <
n  < ________r4_______
r l > 2r3 + R f^ 2 OLt2
Proposition 2 implies that the likelihood that the follower's initial debt level deters the 
leader's borrowing at present:
a. rises with the follower's costs of risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty 
about the leader's borrowing at present (RpOLt2),
b . declines with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged 
on its own borrowing at present (ri),
c. rises with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate charged 
on the leader's borrowing at present (r2) through a decline in the credibility of the 
reference group to which the leader and the follower are affiliated.
Proposition 3 (the effect of Dpt-i on Bpt*): If y>0, then :
dBpt* > 
dDpt-i < U
I I  > r4(l-2r4) 2r3db — _ "T
r l 2r3 + Rp r42 OLt t4 
(A proof is provided in the Appendix.)
Proposition 3 implies that, given that y>0, the likelihood that the follower's initial debt 
level deters its borrowing at present:
a. declines with the follower's costs of risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty 
about the leader's borrowing at present (R pan2), as long as r4<0.5,
b. rises with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate charged 
on its own borrowing at present (ri),
c. declines with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged 
on the follower's borrowing at present (12) through a decline in the credibility of 
the reference group to which the leader and the follower are affiliated.
Proposition 4 (the effect of D u-l on Bpt*): If 7>0, then 
dBFt* > n
dDu-1 <
as a  > r4(l-2r4) + 2r3
r2 < 2r3 + Rpr42
Proposition 4 implies that, given that y>0, the likelihood that the leader's initial debt level 
deters the follower's borrowing at present:
a. declines with the follower's costs of risk bearing stemming from the uncertainty 
about the leader's borrowing at present (RpCJLt2). as long as r4<0.5,
b. declines with the effect of the follower's initial debt level on the interest rate on its 
own borrowing at present (ri),
c. rises with the effect of the leader's initial debt level on the interest rate charged on 
the follower's borrowing at present fo ) through a decline in the credibility of the 
reference group to which the leader and the follower are affiliated.
Propositions 1 to 4 indicate that the leader's and follower's initial levels of 
indebteness affect the leader's and follower's current borrowing levels in several ways 
and directions, and hence their total effects are not clear a priori. It is important to note 
that if  y<0, the inequalities indicated by propositions 3 and 4 are reversed. However, 
equations 10 and 13 indicate that the greater the followers' degree of absolute risk 
aversion and level of uncertainty about the leaders borrowing level, the greater the 
likelihood that y  is positive.
5 . LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS' ESTIMATED BORROWING  
EQUATIONS
The leaders and followers' borrowing equations developed above are estimated in 
this section in order to quantify and test further the hypothesized financial 
interdependencies between developing countries affiliated to a common reference group 
summarized by propositions 1 to 4. The estimation utilizes annual observations on the 
external debts and borrowing of developing countries in millions of U.S. dollars at 1985 
prices for the period 1975 to 1986. The countries included in the empirical analysis are 
classified according to regional affiliation into three general groups —  Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific. The data source and the countries affiliated to any 
of these groups are indicated in the comment to Table 1. The leaders in each of the 
regional groups are identified by their outstanding high level of annual borrowing: Brazil 
and Mexico in Latin America; Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire in Sub-Saharan Africa; and India 
and Indonesia in Asia-Pacific. The rest of the countries are classified as followers. The 
estimation is performed with annual observations on the aggregate borrowing and initial 
indebtedness levels of the two types of countries in each of the regional groups. The 
estimation results are obtained by the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure that minimizes 
the sum of squares of the transformed residuals, and are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. The estimated borrowing equations coefficients for leaders and 
followers in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific  
1975-1986*
E xplanato ry  var iab les Latin America Sub-Saharan  Africa Asia-Pacific
Leaders' Borrowina Eauation
constant 463.5705 -999.55998 19341.38
(0.124) (0.402) (2.602)
The leaders' aggregate level of 0.7994862 -0.06111733 -0.5722540
indebtedness (D J (3.361) (0.281) (2.412)
The followers ' aggregate level of 0.6445407 0.1729466 0.1653956
indebtedness (Dp) (1.549) (0.738) (1.748)
R2 0.964 0.163 0.319
F-test statistic 681.6729 4.970476 2.926900
Durbin-Watson test statistic 1.736 1.596 1.955
Followers' Borrowina Eauation
constant 23272.287 3089.440 31261.98
(4.031) (0.847) (2.354)
The leaders' aggregate level of -0.1244822 0.1127531 -0.8408428
indebtedness (DL) (2.895) (0.390) (2.294)
The followers' aggregate level of 0.2554852 -0.1365340 0.1941243
indebtedness (DF) (3.494) (0.420) (1.274)
R2 0.461 0.135 0.226
F-test statistic 51.54835 2.508637 2.356048
Durbin-Watson test statistic 2.035 1.884 2.188
‘ The t-ratios are indicated in the parentheses.
In general, the estimation results of the leaders and followers' borrowing 
equations are statistically significant in the cases of Latin America and Asia-Pacific, but 
are not significant in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. The lack of statistically significant 
estimation results in the later case is probably due to the fact that the predominant share of 
credit to the African countries was provided by non-profit international funds. The 
significant findings are as follows.
While the effect of the leading countries' absolute initial level of indebtedness on 
their current annual borrowing is significantly positive in the case of Latin America, it is
significantly negative in the case of Asia-Pacific and detering further borrowing. 
Recalling proposition 1, these findings might indicate that while the underlying factor "c" 
dominates factors "a" and "b" in the former case, the underlying factors "a" and "b" 
dominate factor "c" in the later.
In both the Latin American and Asia-Pacificn cases the effect of the following 
countries aggregate initial level of indebtedness on the leading countries borrowing is 
significantly positive. In view of proposition 2, this finding might indicate that the 
underlying factor "b" dominates the underlying factors "a" and "c".
In contrast, in both the Latin American and the Asia-Pacificn cases the leading 
countries' aggregate level of indebtedness significantly deter the following countries’ 
aggregate borrowing. Recalling proposition 4, this finding might indicate that the 
underlying factor "c" dominates factors "a" and "b".
In both the Latin American and the Asia-Pacificn cases the following countries 
initial aggregate level of indebtedness does not deter their current borrowing. Moreover, 
in the case of Latin America, the following countries level of borrowing significantly 
increases with their initial level of indebtedness. In view of proposition 3, this finding 
might indicate that the underlying factors "a" and "c" dominate factor "b".
6 .  GLOBAL W ELFARE CO NSID ER A TIO N S AND A JO IN TLY  
COORDINATED CREDIT SYSTEM
The adverse effects of the externalities described and assessed in the previous 
sections on the global welfare level of the developing countries can be moderated by a 
jointly coordinated borrowing. The general framework of a jointly coordinated 
borrowing is based on the maximization of a Bergson-Samuelson global welfare function 
defined on the individual countries’ utilities from consumption, where each country’s 
consumption possibilities depend upon its borrowing level, and where the global 
borrowing level is constrained:
max W[Ul (C it), ..., U * (CNt)] 
B u  -  BNt
subject to
Cjt — OCi Yit NIMit - RPMit - IPLit
J N N
- [ri Dit-i + r2  YTT ^  Djt-1 + O Bit + r4 I  BjJ Bit 
j* l  j*i
fit
for every i = 1,...,N, and
N
I  Bjt = B. (17)
j= l
The necessary condition for maximum global welfare implies
aw 0U1 r
a u i  3Q  [«i yi - (n + r3 Bi)] = \i (18)
for every country i = l , ..., N; where |i is the shadow value of the global credit constraint. 
As can be seen from the necessary condition for maximum, such a coordinated credit 
system leads to the following globaly desired properties:
1. The net marginal benefits from extending credit to either country i=l,...,N; i.e., 
the marginal product of credit minus the marginal factor cost of credit; are the 
same in terms of global welfare units.
2. The uncertainty about the borrowing levels of the rest of the countries and the 
accompanying costs of risk bearing for the individual country are eliminated. 
Although from a global welfare perspective there is a need for a higher degree of
co-ordination in view of the externalities existing in the credit market and the 
segmentation of this market, the design and application of such co-ordination is very 
difficult. The Bergson-Samuelson welfare function is nothing but a very general way to 
describe global welfare and hence it is not much use in deciding what kind of ethical 
judment might be reasonable in allocating credit to developing countries. This problem 
is, of course, the major obstacle in establishing a jointly co-ordinated credit system.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper was concerned with the potential transfer of externalities among highly 
indebted developing countries that might affect the cost of credit to the individual debtor 
country. These externalities stem from the free-rider problem characteristic to price 
pooling: as long as the supply curve of credit is positively sloped, the interest rate charged 
on credit extended to a particular country is affected by the aggregate borrowing level of 
the rest of the countries. Moreover, the relatively high level of indebtedness of big 
developing countries and their problems to service their external debts, might adversely 
affect the reputation of the developing countries as a whole and reduce their financial 
credibility. The estimation of the interest rate equations confirmed the significant role of 
these externalities in explaining the cost of credit to individual countries in the three 
distinct developing regions of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia-Pacific.
This paper considered further the external effect on the individual country's cost 
of credit imposed by uncertainty about the rest of the countries' borrowing beaviour. 
Since the individual country does not have full information about the borrowing of its 
counterparts debtors, it perceives the interest rate on loans taken during the present period 
as a random variable, and hence might suffer from substantial costs of risk bearing. The 
implications of this type of externality on the borrowing beaviour of developing countries 
were analyzed within the context of a stochastic Stackelberg-type model, in which big 
borrowing countries maximizes expected utility from consumption subject to their 
resource constraint while taking into account the reaction of the following smaller 
borrowing countries. The estimation results of the derived borrowing equations were 
found to be statistically significant in the cases of Latin America and Asia-Pacific. The 
empirical findings indicate that in the Latin American and Asia-Pacific cases the initial 
levels of indebtedness of the relatively small-borrowing countries raise the borrowing 
levels of the big-borrowing countries. In contrast, the small-borrowing countries demand 
for credit is deterred by the big-borrowing countries initial level of indebtedness. In 
terms of the conceptual model, this small-borrowing countries reduced demand for credit 
corresponds to the increase in the interest rate arising from the adverse effect of the big- 
borrowing countries initial level of indebtedness on the credibility of the regional group as
a whole. It is also aimed at lowering the small-borrowing countries costs of risk bearing 
stemming from the uncertainty about the big-borrowing countries demand for credit. 
This empirically indicated asymmetry reveals the role that the externalities inherent in the 
international credit market play to the disadvantage of the small-borrowing developing 
countries.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The differentiation of equation 14 with respect to Dpt-i implies
= -p(ri - r 2r4y + rir42(3y) |  0
as r42 J3y - r2r4 y/ri = -1. And given that y>0,
|  0 as r4(r2/ri - r4(3) |  1/(3.
By substituting equations 10 and 13 for P and y, respectively
dBFt* > n 
dD pn  < U
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof: The differentiation of equation 14 with respect to DLt-i implies
= 'P (r2 '  rir4  ̂+ r2r24pY) |  0
as r42Py - rir4y/r2 = -1.
Given that y>0,
By substitution equations 10 and 13 for {3 and y, respectively,
dBFt* > 0 
d D u -l < U
ri > r4( l-2r24) 2r3as — = ------—------ —— -  + — —. QED
r2 < 2r3 + Rpr24aL t2 r4
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